Maritime Piracy

These boundary disputes include rivalries over maritime borders. During colonial times, maritime borders were often not decided upon by demarcating actual boundaries, but were determined by ownership of islands. After independece, numerous agreement were reached to establish clearer maritime boundaries in souhteast asia. However, as discussed in chapter 3, control and ownership of the sea changed fundamentally with the adoption of UNCLOS and its widely accepted guidelines on the nature of, and jurisdiction over, different maritime zones. With the establishment of ZEE's -- which reached up to 200 miles offshore -- and the ability of some states, including Indonesia and the Philippines, individual countries were considerably extended.

The demarcation of boundaries at sea and the extension of national waters stemming from UNCLOS have led to disputes among southeast asian countries, and bangladeh and its neighbours, due to overlapping claims of ownership of ocean areas and islands. Indeed, as such maritime disputes have primarily emerged over islands in strategic locations, access to fishing grounds, and, most importantly, over areas in which natural resources such as oil or gas are located, rivalry among countries over ownership of water and islands has intensified in recent years. While some of these disputes have been resolved over the years,  there are some maritime borders in the region that are still not agreed upon. An example is overlapping claims of ownership of the spratly islands, involving six different nations.

To legitimate their claims in such disputes and protect their borders and natural resources from foreign actors, southeast asia states and bangladesh have built up military forces and law enforcement agencies, with land-based, as well as maritime, capabilities

The military

With the exception of thailand, the militaries in southeast asian countries and bangladesh emerged either out of colonial armies (as in Malaysia), or out of armed resistances movements against colonial power or other occupying forces (as in indonesia and bangladesh). From the beginning, militaries and government in many southeast asian countries and bangladesh have had a closed relationship, with high-ranking military officers often maintaining close ties to the political elite or being directly involved in politics.

All of the newly emerging independent southeast asian countries inherited military equipment from their former colonial powers and relied, in the early years, on equipment and training provided as aid by foreign military forces, particularly the united states and britain, and in the case of indonesia, the soviet union. Thailand, which had not been a colony, relied heavily on the united states in terms of security. When this foreign assistance to southeast asian countries began to decline in early 1970s, large quantities of low priced second-hand armaments were bought from britain, france, and israel to equip and expand local military forces. However, when indonesia, thailand, malaysia, and singapore became more affluent in the mid-1980s, more sophisticated weaponry and equipment were also purchased. Yet, military spending and the size of weapons contracts remained modest in southeast asia throughout the 1980s. Indeed, while military spending varied between countries in southeast asia, it remained low in comparison to the defence budgets of other developing countries in latin america and africa.

In the early years after independence, the security threats faced by many of the newly emerging southeast asian nations were primarily challenges to the national territorial integrity from within nation states and included ethnic secessionist movements and communist insurgents.

The development of national armed forces was, therefore, at the time, centred on strategies that aimed to protect the nation form internal threats. To address these threats, particular emphasis was initially placed on the development of armies, rather than navies. However, because of the geographical features of southeast asia and the increasing importance of protecting national waters, the maritime capabilities of local militaries (and police forces) were also developed and patrol vessels and second-hand capital ships were purchased. While booth suggest that generally the role of naval forces is threefold and includes military, diplomatic, and policing tasks, snyder points out that:

"the main task of maritime forces [in southeast asia] has been and continues to be 'asserting sovereignty and [securing] maritime resources, very often and disputed maritime zones'. The role of these forces is primarily focused on the policing role of protecting resources in their exclusive economic zones and in dealing with low level, non-traditional threats such as piracy, drug and other smuggling, and since 11 september 2001, terrorism.

Indeed, in southeast asian countries, the navy had, and often still has, external defence as well as internal security responsibilities, and plays an important role in securing  national waters and combating maritime crime.

Historically, the role and development of navies differed between countries, with factors such as the countries' resources affecting the strengths of their respective naval forces. Singapore and malaysia, for example invested considerably in modernization of their navies, particularly since the early 1980s, when their economies grew stronger. the indonesian navy also initially received substantial support under president soekarno. However, when soeharto come to power in 1967, the navy was downsized for political and economics reasons, but money was invested to modernize the ageing fleet. Thailand increase its naval power and became more self-reliant in Terms of maritime security after the united states support declines in the mid-1970s. In comparison other southeast asian nations, the defence budget of the philippines remained small and its defence forces -- in particular the air force and navy -- received little money for modernization and repair. The philippines relied heavily on security provided by the united states and as a result of US military assistance, the navy had a comparatively large number of vessels at its disposal by the 1980s. However, the majority of these vessels were vintage ships in poor shape, with an average age of over forty years.

Like the philippines, bangladesh only spent modest amounts on its military, including its maritime forces. Bangladesh's navy was established in 1972, one year after bangladesh won independence from pakistan. In the pakistan era (1941-1971), the navy was largely neglected and the mukti bahini (liberation army)  had no maritime assets (except for several combat divers). The newly established bangladesh navy therefore inherited little from pre-existing forces. Furthermore, bangladesh economy did not develop as rapidly as the economies of the southeast asian countries and funding for its navy remained modest. Consequently, while the bangladesh navy had grown into a coastal and riverine defence force by late 1980s, it hard no air wing, marine corps, or reserves.

Due to the transnational nature of the security threats and criminal activities conducted at the sea, including piracy and smuggling activities, cooperation between naval forces in southeast asia and between bangladesh and its neighbours is of importance. Indeed, as bateman points out: "navies have a clear advantage over other military services in promoting regional security co-operation because they form part of both a defence cummunity and a maritime community. They tend to carry less political 'baggage'." however, cooperation between bangladesh and its neighbours remained difficult. Collaboration with india was, for  instance, hampered by tensions between the two countries stemming from, among other issues, overlapping claims of ownership of islands and waters that dated back to the 1970s. Within the wider framework of southeast asia, multilateral naval cooperation also remained limited during the cold war, with a clear divide between communist and non-communist countries. Yet within these parameters, some bilateral naval activities and exercises took place in the region and vessels from the USSR and the united states assisted in organizations, particularly ASEAN, offered for discussions, aiming to build confidence and dialogue between states to improve regional security cooperation.

Political and economic changes after the end of the cold war

With the end of the cold war, a new world order emerged and security cooperation in southeast asia slowly improved. This increased cooperation was manifested through joint exercises and operations between naval forces and other maritime law enforcement agencies from different southeast asian countries, including search and rescue exercises and operations to combat different types of criminal activity at sea. Furthermore, joint exercises between southeast asian navies and naval forces outside the region, including the united states and australia, have taken place on a more regular basis. However, despite the increased interest of countries in and the beyond southeast asia in enhancing maritime security cooperation in the region, agreement soften remained limited to promoting dialogue, confidence building measures, and pledges of greater cooperation in the future. Indeed, it was only after the september 11 terrorist attacks and the attacks on the USS cole, the limburg, and the maritime attacks conducted by the abu sayyaf that regional and international maritime security cooperation between countries became more pronounced.

Furthermore, with the end of the cold war, the number of superpower naval vessels patrolling sea lanes was significantly reduced in southeast asia, with a sharp decline in the number of warships from the former soviet union in the region's waters. The presence of US forces in southeast asia was reduced in 1991 and 1992 by withdrawal of US troops from the philippines, including the closure of the clark air force base and subic bay naval base. The US congress also placed strict limitations on military-to-military contacts with indonesian forces in 1993 because of concern about human rights violations by the indonesia military in east timor. As a result of the withdrawal of USSR and US forces from the region, stretches of international and national waters in southeast asia were lift without regular naval patrols. However, since 1989, other powers, particularly china, india, and japan, have increased their military interests and influence in maritime southeast asia.

Southeast asian armed forces not only had to adapt to the changed security environment in the region, but also had to modernize their militaries, as the second-hand equipment bought during the 1970s and 1980s was approaching obsolescence. In response, southeast asian states intensified their effort to build up indigenous defences industries, while simultaneously buying equipment from foreign countries. Indeed, due to the continuing economic success experienced throughout the first half of the 1990s, southeast asian countries were in a better position than ini earlier years to expand and modernize their military forces, including their navies, both in quantity and quality. The upgrading of the naval forces was triggered by concerns such as overlapping claims of ownership of islands and ocean areas, the importance of the maritime trade, and a growing desire to become more self reliant in terms of maritime security. Emphasis has, therefore, been placed on the modernization of the technology for information collection and airborne surface surveillance, capabilities to improve coastal surveillance, and the monitoring of ZEE to address problems such as illegal immigration. Furthermore, equipment suitable for addressing new security threats were acquires, including, for example, faster boats to apprehend smugglers and pirates operating on small speedboats. While military spending varied between countries in southeast asia, with the philippines spending considerably less on their naval forces than thailand, malaysia, indonesia, and singapore, the scale of purchases of new (and the modernization of old) naval equipment in southeast asian countries triggered fears of naval arms race in the region by the mid-1990s. However, as bateman pointed out in 1996, singapore, thailand, malaysia, and indonesia still remained only medium maritime powers despite modernization programmes, with no major maritime power, such as russia, france, or united kingdom, located in southeast asia. Even in comparison to the naval capabilities of southeast asian forces remained moderate.

In 1997, the expansion and modernization of the military and naval forces in southeast asia slowed down due to the asian financial crisis, which affected the economies of all countries in the region, but particularly those of thailand, indonesia, and to a lesser extent malaysia.

As a result of the crisis, various states in the region had less capital available to finance military modernization programmes, with equipment procurement plans being either delayed, postponed, or, in some rare cases, completely suspended. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, indonesia was forced to cut back its defence budget by 40 per cent, while thailand reduced its military budget by 30 per cent in 1998 and made further cuts the following year. Malaysia and philippines had to make fewer concessions, but were also forced to slow down or withdraw some existing modernization plans. Overall, in 19998, ASEAN members spent one third less than in 1997 on their armed forces. The exception here was singapore, which increased its military budget by 5 per cent in 1998.

Both local economies and military spending recovered within a few years in most countries in southeast asia. Indeed, increasing concerns about the political stability of indonesia, unresolved boundary disputes accelerated by rising demand for natural resources, and concern about the presence of foreign powers in the region caused governments to increase military spending according to resources available. Malaysia, being less affected by the crisis than most other countries in the region, was able to resume its naval modernization programme more quickly than its neighbours. The indonesian and thai navies on the other hand struggled longer with funding problems, and the philippine navy, despite some efforts at modernization, is still considered the weakest in southeast asia. However, in addition to national efforts to modernize naval forces, some countries in the region, including the philippines and indonesia, received substantial financial assistance and training from the united states after the 11 september attacks to strengthen the capacities of their militaries and police forces to combat terrorism.

Bangladesh also experienced tremendous political changes in 1990s. In 1990 the military government collapsed, giving way to civilian rule which has been plagued by internal unrest. Overall, bangladesh never experienced the same ecomonic growth as the southeast asian states, with 44 per cent of population still living below the property line in 2004. Consequently, the navy in bangladesh has less money available than the navies of southeast asian countries and has relied largely on second-hand equipment from UK and China. However, indigenous built in the country. Furthermore, bangladesh established additional law enforcement agencies, including a coast guard, to assist in the fight against piracy and the other security threats, in order to allow the navy to focus more directly on defence and war fighting abilities. In fact, the navies of southeast asian countries also increasingly share the task of safeguarding national waters with other government agencies, such as the coast guard and the marine police.

As regional economies began to recover in 1990, several southeast asian militaries adopted a new strategy to enhance modernization. Although coping with internal security challenges remains an important concern, this responsibility is being transferred from the army to the national police. Singapore, thailand, and malaysia are making this transition. Even indonesia, whose military remains embroiled in domestic upheavals, plans to transfer internal security responsibilities to the police as the internal situation warrants. (Simon)

However, regardless of the type of government agency responible for maritime security, their resources, funding and cooperation with agencies from neighbouring countries have a direct impact on the occurrence of pirate attacks.